Des encryption for mac code#
Des encryption for mac mac#

Des encryption for mac mac#

MACs differ from digital signatures as MAC values are both generated and verified using the same secret key. This means that even if an attacker has access to an oracle which possesses the secret key and generates MACs for messages of the attacker's choosing, the attacker cannot guess the MAC for other messages (which were not used to query the oracle) without performing infeasible amounts of computation. To be considered secure, a MAC function must resist existential forgery under chosen-message attacks. While MAC functions are similar to cryptographic hash functions, they possess different security requirements. Clearly we require that any adversary cannot directly query the string x on S, since otherwise a valid tag can be easily obtained by that adversary.

), 1 n) denotes the set of the queries on S made by A, which knows n.

) denotes that A has access to the oracle S( k,.

Ī MAC is unforgeable if for every efficient adversary A Pr [ k ← G(1 n), ( x, t) ← A S( k,

V (verifying) outputs accepted or rejected on inputs: the key k, the string x and the tag t.

S (signing) outputs a tag t on the key k and the input string x.

G (key-generator) gives the key k on input 1 n, where n is the security parameter.

Des encryption for mac code#

įormally, a message authentication code ( MAC) system is a triple of efficient algorithms ( G, S, V) satisfying: It should be computationally infeasible to compute a valid tag of the given message without knowledge of the key, even if for the worst case, we assume the adversary knows the tag of any message but the one in question. That is, return accepted when the message and tag are not tampered with or forged, and otherwise return rejected.Ī secure message authentication code must resist attempts by an adversary to forge tags, for arbitrary, select, or all messages, including under conditions of known- or chosen-message.

A verifying algorithm efficiently verifies the authenticity of the message given the key and the tag.

A signing algorithm efficiently returns a tag given the key and the message.

A key generation algorithm selects a key from the key space uniformly at random.

Informally, a message authentication code system consists of three algorithms: RFC 4949 recommends avoiding the term message integrity code (MIC), and instead using checksum, error detection code, hash, keyed hash, message authentication code, or protected checksum. However, some authors use MIC to refer to a message digest, which aims only to uniquely but opaquely identify a single message. Thus the motivation is to provide a secure data transfer in the wireless medium in IEEE term message integrity code (MIC) is frequently substituted for the term MAC, especially in communications to distinguish it from the use of the latter as media access control address ( MAC address). The implementation is done on the NS-2 platform to compare and analyzes the performance of this with DES and RSA algorithms, based on the following three criteria: (a) Bit rate (b) Packet delay and (c) The number of packets.

The CCM mode combines Counter (CTR) mode for privacy and Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code (CBC-MAC) for authentication. It uses the Counter Mode with CBC-MAC (CCM) mode of operation. The CCMP protocol is based on Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryption algorithm. CCMP protocol is to provide robust security. Compared to DES, AES contains CCMP which is a security standard that provides the highest level of security to encrypt and authenticate the data simultaneously. The comparative analysis is implemented in IEEE 802.11i wireless platform.

The Rijndael algorithm was adapted as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm, to Data Encryption algorithm (DES), which have been in the security standards since long time. The comparative analysis of the renowned cryptographic algorithms AES, DES and RSA.